'indecent' material and the interests of children). While we will discuss throughout this Article the realistic availability and the alleged adverse effects of several other communications media and technologies, we will not attend more than fleetingly to broadcast radio, given the relative lack of current peer-reviewed scholarly studies of broadcast radio in this respect. For some loosely related speculative possibilities, consider the prospect of Howard Stem's departure from SiriusXM satellite subscription radio to a model of monthly fee-based Internet podcasts. See Jere Hester, Online Stern Could be a Net Gain For Fans, available at http://www.nbcwashington.com/entertainment/celebrity/Online-Stem-Could-be-a-Net-Gain-For-Fans-102477654.html (September 8, 2010) (last visited Apr 13, 2011). Whether on SiriusXM satellite radio or via Internet podcasts, Howard Stem would of course remain largely beyond current FCC broadcast regulatory jurisdiction for speech content. See, e.g Even more importantly, I focus on questions of the realistic effectiveness of typical broadcast television regulations in promoting the typically cited governmental interests in our own contemporary technological and cultural environment. 15 In other words, do Pacica-type regulations really solve the problems typically cited by government regulators? There is little point, beyond futile symbolism, in citing a governmental interest, drafting a broadcast speech regulation, and carefully avoiding broad regulatory language, if the regulation does not genuinely advance the cited interest to a sufficient degree. 1 Content-based regulations of speech should not simply be assumed to be effective in practice.
This Article concludes, based on the developing evidence, that typical Pacifica-style content regulations of broadcast television speech simply fail to meaningfully promote the typically cited regulatory interests in question. 17 Today, and likely moreso in the future, technological and cultural trends conspire against the effectiveness of Pacfica-style broadcast regulations.
The crucial development is that, increasingly, any one readily accessible communication technology conveniently substitutes for another. The ability of federal regulation to effectively prevent children and young adults from accessing, via one communications technology or another, broadcast material or its equivalent that is deemed inappropriate is already minimal and is rapidly diminishing. Culture and technology have outpaced the sort of regulation in question, and rendered such regulations ineffective.
Simply put, even the most carefully drafted restrictions of such broadcast speech should be declared unconstitutional if the government cannot sufficiently show that its interests will genuinely be sufficiently advanced in practice. Children and young adults of various ages, however, now gain convenient access through one technological means or another to the programming that typical Pacifica-type regulations seek to bar to them. Such broadcast regulations burden broadcaster speech without adequately promoting any sufficient governmental interest. The government could theoretically seek to impose Pacifica-type regulations on any and all communication media. But the sheer impracticality, intrusiveness, and unenforceability of most such regulations, today and in the future, rule out such a course.
In pursuing these themes, I first introduce some of the most relevant Pacifictype judicial cases addressing the regulation of broadcast television entertainment programs. 1I briefly sample some of the law review and other literature critiquing or defending such regulations 1 9 in order to establish current legal sentiment in this regard. Eventually, this Article refers to highlights of the social science literature 20 and other related critiques to get a sense of what can be validly claimed regarding the direction and extent of some of (broadcast) television's effects. Concluding, for example, that broadcast television is somehow associated, even causally, with something we call "aggression" might in some contexts and for some purposes tell us something of value. This Article also acknowledges the possibility of public interests, tracing back to the discussions of Plato,21 that may strike many as relevant and significant, but which may also be difficult to prove22 in any reasonably politically neutral way. But all of these concerns turn out, in our own context, to be of at most only secondary importance. This Article instead focuses on the rapidly evolving phenomena by which broadcast entertainment, or its equivalent, is readily transferred, conveyed, or otherwise migrates, to other media.23 Some of the media in question are no less accessible to children and young adults than familiar television sets, with or without parental V-chips. For some such media, the realistic prospects for legally regulating content for child and young adult viewers, without impairing the viewing choices of mature adults,24 are minimal. As a result, Pacifica-type broadcast regulations are now obsolete and ineffective. A brief Conclusion then calls for appropriate reform of Pacifica and related broadcast standards, and responds to objections. 
II. PACIFICA AND THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW

A. Pacifica Itself
The plurality opinion in Pacifica26 is unclear in its reach and scope. Throughout the opinion, it curiously reads like a point-by-point response to the nonmedia draft protest case of Cohen v. California.27 Pacifica also builds, unfortunately, on the shifting sands of then-current communications technology by relying in part on the technological analysis of the prior Red Lion fairness doctrine case.28 Pacifica, an "indecency" rather than a "violence" or "aggression" case, begins by asserting that the FCC's statutory authority to regulate "indecent" broadcast speech is not confined to speech that appeals to a "prurient" interest in sex 29-that is, to an interest in sex that is purportedly shameful, morbid, excessive, or presumably abnormal. 30 This operates to broaden the scope of what might be construed as "indecent," as much purportedly "indecent" language is actually non- 491, 504-05 (1985) ("prurience may be constitutionally defined for the purposes of identifying obscenity as that which appeals to a shameful or morbid interest in sex").
sexual.
As for the practical free speech value of indecent language, the Pacifica Court declares that " [a] requirement that indecent language be avoided will have its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language." 32 One's message or point can, on this view, be imparted in roughly equivalent fashion through either "decent" or "indecent" means. Regardless of whether we find this view persuasive, it was anticipated and rebutted in Cohen. The Court asserted that "much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive force as their cognitive force." 33 If we believe that the Court was right in Cohen, similar reasoning would logically apply in Pacifica or a broadcast television case. In Cohen, the Court had concluded that "we cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process." 34 It is again hard to see why similar reasoning should not apply in Pacifica or in the broadcast television context.
The Court in Pacifica then conceded that the regulation of George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue was based, as least partly, on the content of the speech in question.36 But the fine was not, the Court argued, imposed based on any disagreement with the political ideas expressed by the monologue,37 and was therefore in that sense not based on the content. Rather, the fine was based on a combination of the distinctive way in which the ideas were expressed,38 and the time, context, or circumstances of the radio broadcast in question. 39 The plurality indulged in a distinction between Carlin's message and the means of conveying that message. As to the means of expression, the plurality further announced that "it is undisputed that the content of Pacifica's broadcast was 'vulgar,' 'offensive,' and 'shocking,"'40 of the children directly, 54 and second, in supporting the parental claim to childraising authority within the household. 55 Given the presumed unique pervasiveness of the broadcast media, their unique accessibility to children, and the government interests in child well-being and in supporting parental authority, the Pacifica Court again emphasized contextual factors, including the time of day of the broadcast in question, 56 along with the technological distinctiveness of broadcasting from a number of other media. 57 In previous cases, the Court emphasized the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, presumably not simply in the sense in which most resources are economically scarce, but in the sense that two or more stations broadcasting on the same frequency, unlike two or more newspaper boxes on the same street corner, result in less intelligible speech rather than more.59
B. Post-Pacifica Highlights
Later cases have typically assumed or argued for the continuing vitality of Pacifica's basic logic. Consider, for example, the District of Columbia Circuit's en banc decision in Action For Children 's Television v. FCC. 60 The court, addressing a case of limiting the hours or times of day during which "indecent" material could be broadcast, found that "the government has a compelling interest in protecting children under the age of 18 from exposure to indecent broadcasts."61 Citing what amounts to a strict scrutiny standard,62 the court noted that in Pacifica, "broadcasting . . . received the most limited first amendment protection because of its unique pervasiveness and accessibility to children."63 Then, largely following the analysis in Pacifica, the court majority adopted in particular the interest in supporting parents' supervision of their own children's broadcast media exposure,64 as well as the distinct governmental interest in the physical and psychological well- being of minors in general.
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Judge Harry Edwards' dissenting opinion 66 expressed uneasiness about the continuing viability of the Pacifica analysis, even as of the year 1995. Judge Edwards, in contrast to the majority, saw cable television as increasingly common, in such a way as to gradually reduce any historic gulf in accessibility or pervasiveness between broadcast television and cable television. 67 On that basis, Judge Edwards would have reduced the federal regulatory free speech burden on broadcast television to a less intrusive regime, comparable to that of cable television.68
Judge Edwards also found that the two asserted governmental interests in this case and in Pacifica (reinforcing parental authority and in shielding children from indecent programming) are actually in conflict.69 Judge Edwards found "no evidence that indecent broadcasting harms children." 70 Nor did Judge Edwards find, borrowing from strict scrutiny standards, that the FCC had sought out "the least restrictive means" to advance its cited interests. 71 In each of these respects, Judge Edwards' dissent anticipated important themes that deserve substantially revised and expanded treatment under modem technological circumstances. In crucial respects, as we shall see below,72 developments in communications technology, broadly understood, have unforeseeably multiplied the force of Judge Edwards' observations.
The most recent extended treatment of Pacifica, along with the shifting formulations of the associated FCC regulations, took place in Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 73 hereinafter generally referred to as "Fox." In previous incarnations at the Second Circuit 74 and Supreme Court levels, 75 Fox was treated, generally, as an administrative law case. The focus has been primarily on whether the FCC's changes in its rules regarding broadcast language, including fleeting 65, See id. at 660-63(in particular, the court references "the coarsening of impressionable minds that can result from a persistent exposure to sexually explicit material just this side of legal obscenity," and the public interest in the "quality" as well as the "health" and full maturing of the nation's youth).
66. See id. at 670 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting). 67. See id. at 671. Understandably, given the date of the case, Judge Edwards does not discuss the relevance and role of other evolving communications media. For representative cable television regulation cases, see Playboy Entm't Grp, 539 U.S. at 803 (cable "signal bleed" regulations as content-based and thus subject to strict scrutiny); Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 766 (1996) (plurality opinion) (regulation permitting cable operators to prohibit indecent programming on public access channels as violating free speech clause); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (plurality opinion) (cable television "must carry" regulations as content-neutral and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny expletives, were sufficiently justified by the FCC to avoid being characterized as arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. 76 On remand, and reaching beyond the administrative to the constitutional issue, the Second Circuit held that the then applicable version of "the FCC policy violates the First Amendment because it is unconstitutionally vague, creating a chilling effect that goes far beyond the fleeting expletives at issue here." 78 The Second Circuit briefly raised a number of First Amendment-related concerns, but rested its holding on the asserted undue vagueness of the relevant FCC policies. 79 In doing so, the Second Circuit expressed a certain ambivalence. The court announced, forthrightly, that
[W]e are bound by Supreme Court precedent, regardless of whether it reflects today's realities. The Supreme Court may decide in due course to overrule Pacifica and subject speech restrictions in the broadcast context to strict scrutiny. This Court, however, is not at liberty to depart from binding Supreme Court precedent unless and until the Court reinterprets that precedent. 80 While confining its holding to the issue of FCC policy vagueness, the Second Circuit took it upon itself to remark on the broader first amendment landscape since Pacifica. In particular, the Second Circuit observed that since the Pacifica decision, there has been "an explosion of media sources, and broadcast television has become only one voice in the chorus. Cable television has become almost as pervasive as broadcast-almost 87 percent of households subscribe to a cable or satellite service . . . ."82 Importantly, the Second Circuit then noted that "[t]he internet, too, has become omnipresent, offering everything from viral videos to feature films and, yes, even broadcast television programs." The latter point deserved development, but the Second Circuit immediately veered off onto an unproductive tangent. The court sought to diminish the realistic scope and magnitude of the regulatory interest and associated first amendment issues by pointing to content control technology such as the V-chip. 84 The court pointed out that "[e]very television, 13 inches or larger, sold in the United States since January 2000 contains a V-chip which allows parents to block programs based on a standardized rating system."ss Such a parental content blocking option was thought by the Second Circuit to diminish the severity of the otherwise inescapable
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First Amendment-related tradeoffs, though I will implicitly question below the realistic extent of parental control over children's viewing. 87 In any event, the Second Circuit's holding in Fox, focusing as it does on a narrow finding of unconstitutional vagueness, stops far short of such concerns.
technologies as a condition for their receipt of federal funding, in light of available means of unblocking access); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding statutory restrictions on sending "indecent" materials to minors over the Internet to be content-based and facially overbroad); Sable Commc'n v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (limitations on adult access to indecent but not obscene telephone messages could not be justified where unnecessary to promote the compelling interest in shielding minors from such messages); Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (9" Cir. 2009) (striking down state limits on sale or rental of some violent video games lacking serious value on grounds of a lack of compelling governmental interest and lack of narrow tailoring), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010); American Amusement Machine Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7" Cir. 2001) (violent video game ordinance as to public play by unsupervised minors as lacking a compelling, as opposed to merely plausible, basis in the evidence).
84 
III. WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM CURRENT COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES?
A. Introduction to the Problems
Even a glance at the social science studies regarding the effects of broadcast television and other media on young people indicates a mismatch between the typical focus of judicial attention and the primary focus of social science research. Generally, the judicial focus has been on matters of a sexual nature, including indecency. In contrast, most of the social science studies have focused on forms of aggressiveness, or on one or more dimensions of attentiveness, mood, health, or cognitive learning. 90 Even where there is relevant social science evidence, social science by itself cannot neutrally answer the important constitutional questions for us in some uncontroversial, value-free way. Suppose for the sake of argument that the courts were to choose to impose a strict scrutiny test on a regulation of the content of broadcast television. The courts would then be looking for a compelling governmental interest to justify the regulation, as well as narrow tailoring, or a precise fit, between the scope or burden of the regulation and the scope of the cited compelling governmental interest. 9 1
Each of these two determinations is typically, but unfortunately subject to judicial manipulation within broad limits. 92 Even if they were not thus manipulable, it remains unclear how much social science evidence should reasonably be required in any given context. In a complex culture, far beyond randomized control groups and the controllability and simplicity of a chemical in a beaker, issues of cause and effect will often be dense, complex, murky, and contested. 93 To say that one cultural phenomenon clearly, and to some measurable extent, causes another complex cultural phenomenon, to the exclusion of other possible accounts, may well seem dogmatic, irresponsible, or beyond the real capacities of social science. 380 (1957) for the proposition that in order to protect the interests of children, the state cannot "reduce the adult population to reading only what is fit for children"). Actually, the reliance on Butler, as well as on repeated content warnings and even parental control devices on television sets, is also rendered increasingly insignificant by the rapidly changing inter-substitutability of regulated and unregulated media. And to judicially defer, or not defer, to a legislative or an administrative agency determination hardly solves this underlying problem. Unfortunately, it is often the most genuinely important issues of social science and public policy that seem the least susceptible of even reasonable degrees of proof. 94 Yet our "intuitions" are hardly to be trusted either, and may well vary, especially concerning various kinds of media effects. 95 This is as true for legislatures and agencies as for reviewing courts and their own judicial intuitions. Ultimately, we can make some real progress in this context not by seeking vainly to reach a consensus on "how much evidence is enough?" or on the extent to which courts should defer to legislative or agency judgment in such matters. Instead, we should take note of the increasingly ineffective nature of typical federal regulations of the content of broadcast television.96 However otherwise welljustified such a regulation might be, any remaining substantial burden on any broadcast speaker or viewer can hardly be justified if widely available technologies and cultural practices allow for, and indeed promote, the ready availability of regulated or similar programming to young persons in alternative unregulated venues. We shall see that this is substantially and increasingly the case. 97 As this ready accessibility in other unregulated media venues continues to increase, the realistic effectiveness of the broadcast regulation further diminishes, and the justification for any significant remaining burden on the content of broadcaster speech diminishes as well.
See infra
B. FCC Broadcast Content Regulation as an Anachronism
Before I briefly consider the state of the social science evidence on media effects, it is crucial to appreciate the remarkable role that various contemporary electronic media play in the daily lives of most young people. Perhaps the most illuminating survey of current patterns of such media use was published in January of 2010 by the Kaiser Family Foundation (hereinafter referred to as the "Kaiser Survey").
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The Kaiser Survey of what we might call the Post-Digital Era contains several remarkable findings. But even its most basic finding is striking: "Eight-to eighteen year olds spend more time with media than in any other activity besides (maybe) sleeping-an average of more than 7 V2 hours a day, seven days a week." 99 99. Id. at 1. For some purposes, a consumer's simultaneous exposure to more than one medium may be important. In what we might consider a choice of favorably connoted terminology, this is widely referred to as "multi-tasking." Why a term like "multi-diversion" or even "multi-crastination" might not be occasionally more genuinely descriptive is typically left unexplored.
increased the amount of time they spend consuming media by an hour and seventeen minutes daily, from 6:21 to 7:38 . . . .,,too Given the increase over that time in what is sometimes charitably referred to as "multi-tasking," that 7 2 hour daily average actually includes a separate and combined total of 10 % hours of media content per day. o0 These figures, it should be noted, include media consumption uses of cell phones, but do not include either texting or talking on a cell phone. 102 Most importantly for our purposes, while the consumption of some sort of television content by young people has actually continued to increase, 10 3 the technological and social nature of such consumption has changed dramatically. As the Kaiser Survey observes, "[t]elevision content . .. once consumed only by sitting in front a TV set at an appointed hour is now available whenever and wherever [one] wants, not only on TV sets in . . . bedrooms, but on . . . laptops, cell phones and iPods@."
1 04 In fact, as of the closing date of the Kaiser Survey, "just 59% of young people's TV watching occurs on a TV set at the time the programming is originally broadcast: fully 41% is either time-shifted, or occurs on a platform other than a TV set."
This ongoing broad cultural development has obvious implications for the practicality of any attempts at parental control in this regard. 106 As well, there are the obvious implications for FCC regulations of the specified broadcasting hours of particular kinds of content. 107 More broadly, there are the implications for the effectiveness of any regulation of broadcast content for young persons when such extreme content is increasingly and conveniently available elsewhere in unregulated formats of increasingly high technological quality.
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Any specific description of media interchangeability with, or crossover from, traditional broadcasting is typically rendered quickly obsolete by technological and market developments. Yet the ready availability to young people of nominally regulated broadcast material, or more extreme such material, in various venues and 100. Id. at 2. 101. See id. For those curious, the average for magazine reading is now down to 9 minutes per day, and for newspaper reading, 3 minutes per day. See id.
102. See id. at 3. It has been estimated that the average American teenager sends over 3,300 texts per month-females more than 4,000 per month, and males more than 2,500 per month, for an overall average of more than six per waking hour, not including voice calls or app usage. See Ben Parr, Average Teen Sends 3,339 Texts Per Month, MASHABLECOM (October 15, 2010), http://mashable.com/2010/10/14/nielsentexting-stats/. More generally, some of the increase in the use of media may be due to technological changes, including greater screen resolutions or data delivery speeds, while some may be due to an increase in the percentage of young people gaining increasingly unfettered access to a particular item of technology. formats, is clear. This reduces the typically cited federal regulatory state interests to mere empty formalism, while continuing to burden the original broadcaster's First Amendment interests. Any number of relevant internet websites, for example, describe their available content, in general terms or through visitor searches. These sites, beginning with (but extending well beyond) the familiar YouTubel09 and Hulu, 110 distribute broadcast television programs, cable television programs, original videos, movies of various sorts, and other programming, creating a general sense of general media fungibility and instant private access. 1 ] At this point, virtually any communication device has the potential to bypass or substitute for or utilize any other, with at least for the moment an especially increasing role for the mature adult use of video smart phones. 112 The realistic, practical effectiveness of FCC content regulation of broadcast media, for whatever asserted public interest, is thus at this point, and increasingly into the future, largely anachronistic, sharply limited, and generally dubious.
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Short of a concerted federal effort to reach out, octopus-like, to impose childproofing regulations on all sorts of evolving novel and hybrid and modified media devices and technologies, including smart phones with video capacity, at the likely primary constitutional expense of adults, this is unlikely to change.
C. The Lessons ofSocial Science
But let us assume, against the increasing weight of contemporary technological developments, that FCC content regulation of the broadcast media could today be applied in some realistically effective fashion. We would then be required as judges, legislators, administrators, or citizens to arrive at least at some 109. See YOUTUBE, www.youtube.com (last visited Apr. 13, 2011) . In yet another dimension of realistically unregulable synergy, Youtube can be pre-installed on some cell phones. YOUTUBE FOR MOBILE, www.youtube.com/mobile (last visited Apr. 13, 2011).
I10. See HULU, www.hulu.com/about (last visited Apr. 13, 2011) (in addition to the free version of Hulu, Hulu Plus is available "on smart TVs, gaming consoles, mobile phones, and more" as a subscription service).
Ill. See, e.g., supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text; Krotoszynski, supra note 58, at 916 (" [w] hether in print, broadcast, cable, satellite, or Internet form, content is no longer a prisoner to its primary means of distribution").
112. See NIELSEN COMPANY, THREE SCREEN REPORT (1st Quarter 2010), available at http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/us/en/reportsdownloads/3%20Screen/20 10/Three%2OScreen%2OReport%20(Ql %20201 0).pdf (tracking patterns of television, internet, and mobile phone video usage, and finding trends toward the increasing use of technically higher quality versions of all three). It is especially worth noting that " [o] ver half (55%) of the mobile video audience is age 25-49, not teens as some might think." Id. at 6. That most mobile video watching is done by competent adults is constitutionally crucial. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383-84 (1957) (declining to hold adults hostage to free speech interest balancing suitable for children).
113. As for any residual issue of effective parental authority, a Google search on April 24, 2011 of the words: "how bypass parental controls" (without quotations marks) yielded 778,000 results. Among the results, at the time, and admittedly without vouching for efficacy, were How to Get Around Parental Controls on the Internet, WIKiHow, www.wikihow.com/Get-Around-Parental-Controls-on-the-Intemet (admitting to some limitations, but equally clearly a decentralized updateable site); several brief YouTube instructional videos; How to Bypass Parental Controls, THE COMPUTER KID, http://computerkid.blogspot.com/2007/09/how-tobypass-vista-parental-controls.html (followed by 158 viewer comments); several responses under Yahoo! Answers; as well as analogous discussions and videos on bypassing or resetting the V-chip controls on various television models, assuming them to be parentally activated in the first place, noting various possible moves and countermoves. vague, tentative, or general sense of the constitutional nature and weight of the various interests at stake. At this moment, we can say that quite a number of methodologically varied studies have been done on several sorts of possible media effects on young persons of various ages. There are a relatively small number of studies regarding the effects of violent video games,I14 but a greater number on television viewing and some measures of aggressiveness, 15 hostility, violence, or effects on mood, cognition, attention, health, or learning, short or long term. )). We might note, however speculatively, that many popular violent video games require active decisionmaking on the part of the player, or "shooter," as opposed to some other forms of media violence, however emotionally involving, or however strongly a viewer might identify with a violent character.
115. See George Comstock, A Sociological Perspective on Television Violence and Aggression, 51 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1184, 1192, 1200 (2008) (referring to "persistent positive correlations between exposure to violent television entertainment and aggressive or antisocial behavior" with "a causal contribution by television" and noting that " [o] utcomes that are more seriously harmful or criminal have much smaller effect sizes, but they are statistically significant and represent the infliction of greater harm than merely hitting, fighting, name-calling, or stealing"); Betty Jo Simmons et al., Television Violence and Its Effects on Young Children, 26 EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUC. J. 149, 152 (1999) (linking television violence with aggression, but interestingly, with respect to constitutional "narrow tailoring" issues, recommending six separate strategies in response, all six of which focus on parental behavior, school curricula, and community programs as distinct from official speech-restrictive government broadcast regulatory policy). Relatively little rigorous work has been done on effects of purportedly indecent television or radio content, and television's effects on mood, cognition, health, attention, and learning do not appear to be the focus of FCC indecency or violence regulation. 
D. The Limitations of Social Science
But for our purposes, the direction of lines of causation really does not loom as a major problem.1 19 Nor is a lack of any detectable correlation of much concern. The social science evidence often, though hardly invariably, turns up some limited degree of correlation, often with a number of other possible causal factors somehow controlled for.1 20 Often, we can reasonably infer that some phenomenon A is correlated with, and perhaps to an extent tends to cause, B. One problem, though, is that A's causal influence on B may be clear, but relatively weak, and shared with a large number of other, perhaps related causal factors.1 21 And even if we can be certain that A has some modest role in causing B, there can be no guarantee that effect B-which may be merely fifteen minutes of paper and pencil-expressed crabbiness in an artificial laboratory setting-fairly represents, or even sheds much light on, any problem or governmental interest that could be called "compelling." There is a clear difference between the concerns raised by moodiness, crabbiness, or schoolyard rowdiness and those raised by things like violent crime. National rates for serious crime are then even further removed.1 22 In any event, the main problem facing government regulation of broadcast content is at most one of the required degrees of proof, or of the contestable application of strict scrutiny. Instead it is, as I have noted, the increasing and already substantial intersubstitutability of various media, with the relevant content being easily accessible in various private formats to young people and adults. Traditional content regulation models become irrelevant as technological and other cultural developments promote nearly unconstrained media content access.123 This is certainly not to dismiss the concerns that responsible media critics have raised, beginning at least from the time of Plato. Plato's account of his ideal society, whatever the media involved, seems in its essentials clear:
[ every poisonous weed they would, little by little, gather insensibly a mass of corruption in their very souls. 124 Such straightforward illiberalism is plainly contrary to our most basic first amendment jurisprudence, and should not constrain our First Amendment jurisprudence. At the same time, though, we cannot be so arrogant as to assume that a strong and consistent devotion to first amendment principles involves no possible social and cultural costs. Consider the valuable perspective of contemporary philosopher Simon Blackburn:
Before we mock Plato we may also reflect on our consumption of art. The average American eighteen year old, it is said, is likely to have watched something like 18,000 murders on TV. Although social science finds it almost impossible to speak with one voice about anything, there is good evidence that this relentless diet not only desensitizes young people, but makes them more fearful (and for that matter, more stupid). Dramatic representations give us patterns which we can follow, and the question of how far children or grown-ups do follow them is an empirical one. Studies appear to vary, and no doubt the contagion varies with many factors, but it is hard to believe that there is none at all. Perhaps Plato is right and our minds are imitative. ... We cannot patronize Plato from a position of wisdom or success in knowing how to feed people's minds. 125 Blackburn rightly emphasizes both the difficulty in clearly linking the worst social outcomes, in any large measure, to some particular content of some particular medium, and our vague, uncodifiable uneasiness at the cumulative effect of any communications medium, or of popular entertainment and heavily commercialized media in general.1 26 In certain moments, some of us may feel that we intuitively know more than we can tell about the effects of entertainment and commercial media, including possible harms.127 We can, however, hardly pretend that our collective intuitions as to the degree of harm of speech regulated for its content are unanimous.128 NOT does social science typically present us with unequivocal answers at a level of specificity we would find most useful.129 This is especially so given what has been called the "causal density," or the complex network of contributing causes, of the social phenomena of greatest interest. 130 And certainly, this causal density problem does not disappear when we examine the possible consequences of particular media, or of entertainment and commercial media in general. 131 
IV. CONCLUSION
As we have seen, the policy logic underlying Pacifica-type regulations of the content of broadcast television and radio, whatever its initial strength, has, in our Post-Digital Era, disintegrated nearly completely. As the Second Circuit has recently observed, the lower courts are not free to simply announce that otherwise relevant Supreme Court case law has been superseded by technological developments.132 But the by now almost complete intersubstitutability of various media, entailing the ready accessibility for adolescents of programs more objectionable to many adults than the broadcast material subject to regulation, proceeds regardless. The patent ineffectiveness of broadcast content regulations renders moot any debates over manipulable criteria such as the proper scope of strict scrutiny, what should count as a compelling governmental interest, and whether a given rule is sufficiently narrowly tailored or unduly vague. 133 It might be asked, though, whether federal broadcast regulators could concede this argument, but then stand the argument on its proverbial head. Yes, the sorts of content the government might wish to regulate are realistically available, via one medium or another, to persons of nearly all ages. But, the argument would run, the sheer pervasiveness of such content-a culture that is awash in such entertainment and commercial content-provides a reason in favor of something like traditional broadcast regulation. The idea would instead be for federal broadcast content regulation to provide for a safe haven; an island; an oasis; a refuge-a shelter from the assumedly dominant popular cultural trends.1 34 In any event, the central image of the argument is perhaps one of a parent and child being able to sit down together to watch a broadcast channel program, in real time, at a reasonable hour, with some assurance that sex, sexual references, or extreme violence need not be anticipated. A "safe haven" from precisely what kind or kinds of content might not, however, be clear at the federal regulatory level. Furthermore, precisely when an "island" of shelter becomes a vast (and arguably repressed) continent, with high costs to the freedom of the broader society, might also at some point arise as an issue.
But the basic problems with such a "safe haven" regulatory rationale are really twofold. First, such a rationale largely abandons the traditional concern for the purported well-being of children, or of the broader culture in general. The goal is no longer, apparently, that of sheltering most young persons from assumedly inappropriate content; that historic goal has by concession become technologically and culturally unrealistic. The goal is instead now much narrower, however appealing the sheltered parent-child joint viewing scenario may be to some.
Second, and far more constitutionally important, though, is that whatever value inheres in such joint "safe haven" viewing scenarios has been, is now, and presumably would remain available, as described above or in some more or less equivalent way, even in the absence of any Pacifica-style broadcast content regulations. Safe haven-based federal regulations are plainly unnecessary in practice. However a parent chooses to define "harmless," some harmless family viewing possibilities, 13 5 in one format or another, or some combination of formats and media, would survive the abolition of Pacifica-type regulations. In a Youtube world, some content-creators and content-aggregators will respond to any significant interest in any sort of content deemed by some to be unobjectionable, in low cost, easily accessible ways. This is not a question of lack of any narrow tailoringl36 of such a "safe haven" regime to its new and narrowed regulatory purpose. The constitutional problem, more directly, is that such a broadcasting "safe haven" rule would burden the speech rights of broadcasters, while at the same time being, as a practical matter, entirely unnecessary. With or without any sort of Pacifica-type broadcast rules, we can confidently anticipate that content unobjectionable to most parents 137 would continue to be available in one form or another of television, DVD or successor media, or the Internet.138 Tastes and standards vary widely, as does correspondingly For an earlier case touching upon some very loosely similar concerns, see FCC v. WNCN Listeners' Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981) (judicially deferring to the FCC's format diversity policy of allowing local market demand for particular kinds of radio programming to override a purported public interest in, or private preference for, preserving a radio station's classical music format).
135. Of course, a conscientious parent could object to all television, public or commercial, broadcast or otherwise. Indeed, there are a number of possible concerns that can be raised. See works cited supra note 119. But such "abstainers" would presumably not in all cases be satisfied by any Pacifica-style regulatory regime either.
136. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 137. We set aside here the scenario of a parent and child reading, together, any unobjectionable book. 138. This point seems inherently so plainly right that any attempt to cite evidence will add little. But consider, merely as suggestive, a few almost randomly chosen items of support: As of September, 2010, the top domestic grossing films of all time, adjusted for inflation, were, in descending order, Gone With the
